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Abstract— The number of smartphones reached 3.4 billion in 
the third quarter of 2016 [1]. These devices facilitate our daily lives 
and have become the primary way of accessing the web. Although 
all desktop browsers filter rogue websites, their mobile counterparts 
often do not filter them at all, exposing their users to websites 
serving malware or hosting phishing attacks. In this paper we 
revisit the anti-phishing filtering mechanism which is offered in the 
most popular web browsers of Android, iOS and Windows Phone. 
Our results show that mobile users are still unprotected against 
phishing attacks, as most of the browsers are unable to filter 
phishing URLs. Thus, we implement and evaluate TRAWL 
(TRAnsparent Web protection for alL), as a cost effective security 
control that provides DNS and URL filtering using several 
blacklists. 
Keywords— Phishing, Mobile web browsers, Android, iOS, 
Windows Phone, Smartphone, Security 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, the use of mobile devices has become pervasive 
and smartphones are now the primary way of accessing the 
web [2]. Smartphones contain a plethora of valuable data, a 
fact that constitutes motivation for an attacker who seeks to 
violate their confidentiality, integrity or availability. According 
to McAfee [3], in 2016 we witnessed an increase in mobile 
malware that is predicted to continue in 2017, as well. In the 
same year, Kaspersky detected almost 3 million malware 
installations on mobile devices [4]. The growing number of 
smartphone targeting malware is inevitable due to the lack of 
security mechanisms [5]. For the past year, the main mobile 
threats were Trojans and banking malware, which were 
distributed through malicious sites delivering advertisements 
[6].  
Consequently, accessing the web presents, more than ever, 
the risk of downloading malicious software. A user could 
accidently download malware, which is commonly known as 
“drive by download”, just by visiting a web page with active 
content. According to authors in [7], 1.3% of Google’s search 
engine queries return at least one link to a malicious site. 
These web pages can be present not only in ‘nefarious’ 
websites (e.g., gambling sites, pirated software, adult sites), 
but also in ‘benign’ sites, such as social media, search engines, 
news sites, which may have been compromised [8]. Web-
based malware attacks are on the rise due to the increasing 
numbers of online applications leveraging the use of a browser 
[9]. Moreover, in the third quarter of 2016, it was reported that 
Internet browsers are the most targeted application by 
cybercriminals [10].  
In addition, web users are exposed to attacks which aim to 
deceive them with the ultimate goal of stealing their personal 
and/or financial information, as well as their login details. This 
type of attack is commonly known as phishing and may lead 
to even more serious crimes, such as identity theft, fraud, 
hacking, etc. Phishing is typically initiated through email, 
SMS, web articles or social media, by including a link to a 
compromised or rogue website. A successful phishing attack 
consists of three main phases [11]: 1) the attacker lures a 
victim to a malicious webserver through an email, SMS, 
advertisement, etc., 2) the victim follows the rogue URL; 3) 
the attacker successfully captures the user’s data. In most 
cases, a successful phishing attack involves both social 
engineering and technological methods [12]. 
To combat the aforementioned threat of rogue web sites, 
i.e., those serving malware or hosting phishing attacks, the 
browser provides warnings to the user as to whether access to 
the requested webpage constitutes a threat. Also, security 
indicators are provided by the browser’s graphical interface. 
For instance, a padlock or link to SSL certificate is available 
next to the address bar for the user to inspect whether a given 
website or webpage can be trusted [13]. However, users often 
ignore these security indicators, as they may 1) lack the 
knowledge regarding phishing related threats; 2) be social 
engineered by a webpage or graphics; or 3) not pay attention 
to the browser’s security indicators [14]. Moreover, these 
security indicators are available for desktop browsers, but not 
for their mobile counterparts [5]. 
One anti-phishing security measure is DNS-filtering. Both 
Google and OpenDNS offer free public DNS services that 
block rogue web sites. Consequently, a user does not need to 
have her own anti-rogue site detection system. However, the 
user has to sacrifice her privacy for this added security, as all 
the traffic is redirected through those companies’ DNS 
servers. Moreover, DNS filtering is able to block malicious 
URLs only on the domain level. For instance, 
www.evilsite.com will be blocked assuming that this is a 
known rogue site, while 
www.legitsite.com/photo.php?code=evilcode will not, 
assuming that the domain www.legitsite.com is a ‘benign’ 
domain that is compromised.  
A security countermeasure that overcomes the previously 
mentioned obstacle of DNS filtering, is the use of URL 
filtering. URL filtering facilitates blacklists, which either 
come with third–party software of the web browser (i.e., 
security extensions) [15] or are pre-installed, such as Google’s 
Safe browsing. In addition, browser extensions, such as 
AdBlock [16] and Ghostery [17] that block advertisements 
(both malicious and benign), nowadays also include blacklists 
for malicious content. Google provides Safe Browsing [18], a 
blacklist which offers protection against both malware and 
phishing. Currently, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and 
Apple Safari implement Safe Browsing. Internet Explorer uses 
Microsoft’s blacklist called SmartScreen [19]. Finally, Opera 
uses a combination of PhishTank[20] and Netcraft[21] 
blacklists against phishing and TRUSTe [22] against malware. 
However, our past work proved that these technologies are 
absent from web browsers in Android and iOS [23], [25], [26]. 
In this paper, we revisit the anti-phishing protection that is 
provided by mobile browsers on the three most popular OS for 
mobile devices, namely: Android, iOS and Windows Phone. 
We also compare this protection to our previous findings. Our 
results show that mobile users are still vulnerable against 
phishing. To raise the bar of the anti-phishing protection that is 
currently offered, we implement TRAWL (TRAnsparent Web 
protection for alL) as an instance of Secure Proxy [25], 
offering a cost-efficient security control against rogue sites. In 
summary, the paper makes the following contributions: 
 
 Compares the anti-phishing protection that is 
provided by mobile web browsers in Android, iOS 
and Windows Phone. This protection is compared to 
our previous findings regarding anti-phishing 
protection in Android and iOS, highlighting the 
evolution of the security mechanisms in mobile 
devices. 
 It implements and evaluates TRAWL as a cost 
effective security control against rogue sites. TRAWL 
is based on our previous work, Secure Proxy that 
aggregates multiple blacklists to provide web users 
with protection against rogue sites. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents related work. Section 3 describes the methodology 
and Section 4 presents our results. Section 5, introduces 
TRAWL. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion of our work 
and suggestions for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Mylonas et al. [23] compared the availability and 
manageability of security controls offered by both mobile and 
desktop web browsers. The results highlighted that web 
browsers for mobile devices lack the necessary security 
controls, which are typically found in desktops. According to 
their results, Safari and Opera Mini had several serious 
security issues such as unpatched vulnerabilities and no 
protection against invalid digital certificates. The protection 
provided by Firefox Mobile was comparable to the protection 
offered by desktop browsers. The evaluation also revealed that 
web users are exposed to third-party advertising due to the out 
of the box protection that is offered by most desktop browsers. 
Wu et al. [24] analysed 115 android mobile browser 
applications in terms of protection against four types of attacks 
on Android devices. Based on their results, more than half of 
the tested browsers were found to be vulnerable.  
Virvilis et al. in [25] and [26] examined the anti-phishing 
and anti-malware protection that is offered by web browsers 
on the two most popular smartphone operating systems, iOS 
and Android, as well as Windows for desktops. The most 
popular web browsers for desktops and mobile devices were 
tested against 2800 rogue URLs (1400 phishing and 1400 
malicious URLs). The tests revealed that the level of 
protection offered by desktop browsers is higher than the one 
in smartphones, even when these browsers implement the 
same technology (e.g., Safe Browsing). Specifically, iOS’s 
default browser offers no protection against malicious URLs 
and limited protection against phishing. Likewise, the default 
Android browser offers no protection against rogue web sites. 
To address these problems the authors proposed the use of a 
secure proxy for analysing URLs with the help of several 
blacklists and AV engines. Their proposed system significantly 
raised the level of protection against rogue sites for both 
mobile and desktop web browsers.  
Amrutkar et al. [27] present a comparison of the security 
indicators available on mobile web browsers and the ones 
available on their traditional desktop version. Their work 
indicates that mobile browsers fail to implement all the 
recommended desktop indicators and show inconsistency 
regarding their availability across the different applications. 
 Akhawe et al. [28] utilized both Mozilla Firefox and 
Google Chrome to collect data regarding effectiveness of 
warning impressions in security events. The authors showed 
that security warnings can have an immense impact on user 
behaviour depending on the demographic group of the user. 
Furthermore, the authors in [29], used statistical data to 
compare a website against known malicious sites in order to 
identify similarities. Antonakakis et al. [30] developed Kopis, 
a system which operates at the upper DNS level and attempts 
to detect malware related domains based on global DNS 
resolution patterns. In [31], authors propose an architecture 
that heuristically selects candidate URLs and determines if 
they exhibit malicious behavior via execution in a virtual 
machine. Finally, the authors in [32] propose Zozzle, a static 
in-browser detector for malicious JavaScript. 
 
Table I. Applications' versions used for evaluation 
Application Android iOS Windows Phone 
Firefox 50.0 5.3 N\A 
Opera 37.0 14.0 9.1.0 
Chrome 54.0 54.0 N\A 
Default browser 2.1.34 N\A N\A 
Internet Explorer N\A N\A 11.0 
Safari N\A version in iOS 10.1.1 N\A 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Testing Enviroment 
Virvilis et al. [25] and Mylonas et al. [23] evaluated the build-
in protection mechanisms offered by various web browsers 
against rogue websites. Their results highlighted that mobile 
users are exposed to this threat. In this work, we revisit their 
experiments on mobile devices to evaluate the anti-phishing 
protection of mobile browsers. We evaluate the popular 
browsers that are available in the three most popular operating 
systems for mobile devices, namely Android, iOS and 
Windows Phone [33] (see Table I).  
Similarly to Virvilis et al. [25] and Mylonas et al. [23], to 
evaluate the protection of the mobile browsers against 
malicious websites a webpage containing 100 links to 
malicious websites was created on a local webserver. The 
devices that were used for the evaluation were running the 
most popular version  of Android, iOS and Windows Phone, at 
the time that our experiments were conducted (October 2016 – 
December 2016). Specifically, we used: a) a Samsung Note 3  
with Android Lollipop for testing the Android browsers, as it 
is the dominant Android version with 35% of the user share 
[34], b) an iPhone 4s with iOS 10.1.1, and c), a Microsoft 
Lumia 540 with Windows 8.1. Moreover, we tested the most 
popular browsers that are available in these operating systems, 
namely Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera, Safari and 
the default browser in Android (referred as Internet or 
Browser in Android). The availability of the web browsers in 
Android, iOS and Windows Phone is summarized in Table I. 
 
B. Mobile browser test 
To evaluate the anti-phishing protection offered by mobile 
browsers we randomly selected 100 confirmed online phishing 
URLs that were reported in PhishTank the day before our anti-
phishing experiments. These URLs were added as links in a 
web page that was hosted on a local web server. Then, with 
each mobile web browser we attempted to visit each of these 
URLs and classified them in one of the following categories: 
 
i. Blacklisted: the URL is successfully detected as a 
phishing attack by the browser and a warning is 
displayed to the user. 
ii. False negative: a phishing URL that is not blocked by 
the browser and therefore exposes the user to a phishing 
attack. 
iii. Non-phishing: a URL that is not blocked by the browser 
but has been suspended/taken down and therefore does 
not expose the user to a phishing attack anymore. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents the experimental results regarding the 
anti-phishing protection of mobile browser in Android, iOS 
and Windows Phone. It also provides a comparison of with 
our previous findings in [23], [25], [26].  
 
Android. Our results suggest that despite the improvements 
with regards to the anti-phishing protection that is offered on 
some of the mobile browsers (namely Firefox and Opera), 
Android users still remain exposed to this threat (see Table II). 
This holds true, as the default, pre-installed Android browser 
and Chrome provide by default no anti-phishing protection. 
Specifically, as shown in Table II the browsers failed to block 
any of the phishing sites. On the other hand, Firefox and 
Opera blocked most of the attacks.  
 
iOS. As illustrated in Table III, during our experiments none 
of the browsers was able to block any phishing attack. This is 
surprising especially in the case of Firefox and Safari, as both 
of their desktop counterparts use Safe Browsing.. Moreover, 
Firefox for Android blocked 80% of the phishing attacks. 
Consequently, this suggests that Firefox for iOS did not 
implement or does not have enabled by default Safe Browsing 
in version 5.3. 
 
Windows Phone. As discussed earlier, at the time of our 
experiments Chrome and Firefox were not available in 
Windows Store for Windows Phone 8.1. The results suggest 
that Windows Phone users are also exposed to phishing 
attacks (see Table 4). This holds true as IE only blocked half 
of the phishing sites, while Opera did not block any of them. 
 
A. Comparison with previous evaluation 
Our results confirm the results in [23] and [25]. Most of the 
findings from the experiments that were conducted in 2014 are 
still valid, i.e., web browsers for mobile devices still fail to 
 
Table II. Results from Samsung Note3 running Android Lollipop (n=100) 
Browser 
False 
Negative 
Blacklisted 
Non-
phishing 
Default Browser 
(v2.1.34) 
57 0 43 
Firefox (v50.0) 16 80 4 
Opera (37.0) 14 75 11 
Chrome (54.0) 52 0 48 
 
Table III: Results from iPhone 4s running iOS version 10.1.1 (n=100) 
Browser 
False 
Negative 
Blacklisted 
Non-
phishing 
Safari 50 0 50 
Firefox (5.3) 56 0 44 
Opera (14.0) 62 0 38 
Chrome (54.0) 62 0 38 
 
Table IV. Results from Microsoft Lumia 640 running Windows Phone 8.1 
(n=100) 
Browser False negative Blacklisted 
Non-
phishing 
IE (11) 28 52 20 
Firefox No app available for Windows 
Opera (9.1.0) 61 0 39 
Chrome No app available for Windows 
 
protect their users from phishing sites. Specifically, only 
Firefox and Opera for Android offer improved anti-phishing 
protection. However, they are third-party web browsers that 
are not necessarily used by the owner of the mobile device. 
The only pre-installed browser that partially protects users 
against phishing is Internet Explorer 11 for Windows Phone 
8.1. Neither Safari for iOS, nor the default pre-installed 
browser for Android offers anti-phishing protection. 
Consequently, users have to install third party browsers in 
order to have a filtering mechanism against phishing sites – as 
well as malicious sites as the absence of the filtering 
mechanism exposes the users to both malware and phishing. 
An Android user can use a third-party browser, such as 
Firefox or Opera - assuming that he has the knowledge to do 
so. However, this does not hold for iOS users as our results 
suggest that still neither the default browser (i.e., Safari) nor 
any third-party browser offers any protection against phishing 
attacks. 
V. TRAWL 
This work uncovers that most mobile browsers do not filter 
rogue websites. Therefore, as discussed in the previous 
subsection, their users are exposed to websites hosting 
phishing attacks and serving malware. In this context, we 
implement TRAWL (TRAnsparent Web protection for alL) as 
an extension of Secure Proxy, a security countermeasure that 
was proposed by Virvilis et al. [25]. This section provides the 
architecture and details about its implementation and 
evaluation.  
A. Architecture 
Secure proxy [25] was design as a cross platform security 
control, which raises the bar of protection against rogue web 
sites. To this end, it queries VirusTotal in order to deduce if a 
given http request should be blocked or not. However, this 
introduces two considerable limitations: a) the online queries 
to VirusTotal leak the users’ browsing history to Google 
servers, thus violating their privacy and b) VirusTotal has 
imposed a restriction of four queries per minute by its public 
API, making secure proxy’s deployment impractical. To 
overcome these limitations, TRAWL uses multiple local 
blacklists from various sources instead of online queries. 
TRAWL acts as a DNS filtering server and a web proxy to 
blocks both rogue domains and URLs, respectively, by 
utilizing multiple local blacklists (see Figure 1).  
TRAWL’s architecture is depicted in Figure 1 and its 
operational flow in Figure 2. Once a client is configured to use 
TRAWL to browse the web, each http request is firstly 
redirected to the DNS filtering server. The server checks 
whether the domain of the queried URL exists on its own 
blacklist. If the domain is blacklisted, then the request is 
rejected and a message is displayed to the user to inform her 
that the requested website is considered a threat and should be 
blocked. In case the URL is not blacklisted by the DNS 
filtering server, the request is examined by the proxy server. 
The proxy server will check the requested URL against its 
blacklists to determine whether it should be blocked or not. If 
the URL is found in the blacklist the request is rejected. 
Otherwise, the request is forwarded. 
B. Hardware and Software considerations 
To implement the module for URL blocking a proxy server 
was selected as: (a) it works not only at the domain level but 
also at URL level, (b) it can speed up the user’s browsing 
experience as it has a good caching mechanism that reduces 
network latency [35] and (c) it has the ability of masking the 
client and therefore improving her anonymity. 
Although, the proxy server is sufficient for filtering 
malicious websites, DNS filtering is a faster solution. Its 
disadvantage is that it cannot detect malicious URLs and 
therefore is limited to domain filtering. However, by combing 
the two approaches we can exploit both their advantages. 
 
Fig.  1. Architecture of TRAWL 
 
We envisage TRAWL as a security control that is free and 
available for everyone. To this end, we used open-source 
software and low cost hardware in order to provide an 
affordable solution. TRAWL relies on bash and python 
scripting and therefore any Unix/Linux operating system 
compatible with the selected hardware can be used as the 
device running TRAWL. Squid [36] was chosen as the proxy 
server as it is a well-known, stable and multi-functional 
software. DNSmasq [37] was chosen as the DNS server 
because of its ability to work with low cost systems. In terms 
of hardware, Raspberry Pi 3 was chosen because of its low 
operational consumption and low price.  
C. Black List Sources 
Using a set of up-to-date lists of rogue websites is essential for 
creating a comprehensive blacklist. In this regard, we have 
aggregated a list of 25 different sources that are used by 
TRAWL to filter rogue websites, namely:  
{Abuse.ch, Amazon, Anti-Adblock Killer, AutoShun, Blueliv, 
Camelon, Comodo Site Inspector, DNS-BH – Malware 
Domain Blocklist, ,Easylist, Fanboy, hpHosts, Malc0de, 
Malekal, Malware Domain List (MDL), Malware patrol, 
Malwared, Open BL organization, OpenPhish, PhishTank, 
Ransomware tracker, Safe browsing, Secure Mecca, Spam404, 
Streans, Zeus tracker} 
The aforementioned list provides protection against a) 
malicious sites, b) phishing sites, and c) advertisements.  
D. Power consumption test 
As stated earlier, one of the goals of TRAWL is to offer to 
the user a cost-efficient solution against rogue websites. For 
this reason, we have conducted three experiments to measure 
the power consumption of the proposed solution.  
During the first experiment the Raspberry Pi was idle with 
no client connected to it. Therefore, TRAWL was active but no 
client device was trying to access any domain. For the second 
experiment we assumed that TRAWL is used in a home 
network in which 5 clients were using it, namely: 3 iPhones, 1 
Samsung Note 3, and a Mac laptop. Users of the connected 
devices were utilizing different browsers to access various 
websites on the Internet. Finally, throughout the last 
experiment the five devices were still connected and in use 
and TRAWL was downloading and updating its blacklists at 
the same time. Each of the experiments was monitored over a 
three-hour period in order to get a consistent record. 
To conduct the experiments an energy power meter [38] 
was used, which essentially acts as a bridge between the mains 
and the Raspberry Pi’s power adaptor. The kit has its own 
battery to operate and measure the electric consumption of 
TRAWL. 
E. Experimental Results 
Figure 3 shows the increase in power consumption when 
clients are connected to TRAWL as well as when its blacklist 
databases were updating. The device consumes 2.2 Watts 
when it is in idle mode and an average of 2.7 Watts when it is 
in use by five clients. However, when the blacklists are 
updated and TRAWL used by five clients, the power 
consumption almost doubles (3.6 Watts). This is expected as 
the greater the computational requirements, the greater the 
amount of power required. 
Figure 4 presents the accumulated energy consumption of 
the Raspberry Pi during the tests. Over the course of three 
hours for each test, there was an average increase of 0.003 
kWh every hour. Getting an average reading, the idle mode 
provokes the least energy consumption at 0.002/kWh; when 
the proxy is in use, the average reading grows to 2.67 Watts 
per hour. Finally, during the last test the reading further 
increases to an average of 4.67/Wh.  
To evaluate how cost-efficient and environment-friendly is 
the TRAWL, the cost of electric consumption and the carbon 
footprint in the United Kingdom is computed. For this we 
considered the cost for a pay-as-you-go tariff (£0.14 per hour) 
[39] and the yearly carbon footprint based on the online 
computation provided by the National Energy Foundation 
[40]. Based on the aforementioned, Table 5 illustrates that if 
the proxy server is running in a household or an SME, it will 
cost a maximum of £6 per year (based on £0.14p/hour electric 
tariff) with a carbon footprint of 3 kgCO2. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Nowadays, smartphones have become a vital part of our 
everyday life. The number of malware targeting mobile 
devices is growing day by day and the majority is being 
distributed through phishing attacks. Therefore, this paper 
evaluates the anti-phishing and anti-malware security 
mechanisms offered by mobile web browsers. We consider the 
most popular web browsers for the three most popular mobile 
operating systems, namely Android, iOS and Windows Phone.  
Our results reveal that the majority of mobile browsers still 
do not offer the necessary protection against rogue websites. 
Specifically, our experimental results suggest that the pre-
installed browsers offer no protection against phishing in iOS 
and Android and inadequate protection (50%) in Windows 
Phone. Firefox and Chrome on Android are the only browsers 
offering an adequate protection against phishing 
(approximately 75-80%). It is worth noting that our results are 
not generalizable, as we used a limited number of rogue 
websites to test the protection that is offered by web 
browsers. However, our results highlight the absence of the 
security control in a number of web browsers for mobile 
devices, which leaves their users exposed to websites serving 
malware and phishing attacks.  
In this context, we present TRAWL, an extension of our 
secure proxy that as we demonstrate is an energy efficient 
security control against rogue web sites. TRAWL offers DNS 
and URL filtering based on multiple blacklists. We decided 
not to implement our proposed countermeasure on client side 
(i.e. on the mobile phone, tablet, desktop etc.) for two reasons: 
a) not to consume the client’s resources (battery, processing 
power etc.); b) to provide a cross-platform solutions, 
independent from the device’s OS. One of our goals was to 
create a cost-efficient domestic security control and therefore 
we chose Raspberry Pi as the hardware that hosts TRAWL. 
Finally, we designed TRAWL having domestic or SME usage 
in mind. Therefore, we have not considered any performance 
or scalability requirements that might arise in a more complex 
corporate environment, which we consider as out of our scope. 
Our results prove that TRAWL is efficient in terms of power 
consumption.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.  2. Operational process of TRAWL 
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Fig.  3. Power consumption test for TRAWL that is idle, normal and heavy load 
 
Fig.  4. Accumulated energy test over a 3-hour period in idle mode, with normal load and when it is busy 
 
Manual evaluation is a time-consuming process which 
requires a significant amount of effort and so our corpus was 
limited to 100 rogue URLs only. Furthermore, browsers’ 
frequent updates require constant re-evaluation of the security 
mechanisms in use. Finally, new rogue webpages are created 
every minute, as there are many tools online that can generate 
or clone a legitimate website in a few minutes. TRAWL 
utilizes several blacklists for detecting malicious URLs and 
therefore is based on static knowledge. Such a system is 
inseparably linked with its databases and its performance 
depends on their quality. Consequently, though filtering of 
rogue URLs is a well-used method as it produces a high rate 
of true positive as its efficiency depends on the blacklists in 
use. 
For future work we plan to extend TRAWL to include 
Google’s Safe Browsing. Moreover to overcome the manual 
evaluation obstacle we intent to create an architecture for 
automated evaluation of browsers on different platforms 
(mobile and desktop).  
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